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This article argues that Marx, too, knew more about the future than his 
present. Indeed, far from being merely a theorist of mid- to late-19th century 
capitalism, he elaborated the basic mechanisms, tendencies, counter-tendencies, 
contradictions, and social antagonisms that still shape capital accumulation and 
bourgeois societalization at the start of the 21st century. While the prophetic 
nature of his critique of political economy holds for many aspects of his work, 
here I explore two that have important implications for North-South relations. 
These comprise his analysis of the world market as the historical presupposition 
and posit of capital; and, relatedly, its role in generalizing and intensifying the 
contradictions of capital on a world scale. The continued relevance of Marx’s 
analysis often gets disguised by use of the term ‘globalization’ to describe the 
current world economy, with its implication that there is a break between the 
present economic order and earlier periods of mercantilism, free trade 
imperialism, and imperialism based on territorial conquest and trade blocs. 
While mercantilist and imperialist features remain, neo-liberalism and finance-
dominated accumulation have radically changed how the world market operates. 
Accordingly, I consider how the recent wave of neoliberalization has promoted 
even more forcefully (and, in many cases, forcibly) world market integration 
under the logic of capital. Indeed, neoliberalization can be considered as a 
process oriented to the completion of the world market. This does not abolish 
North-South relations; but it does transform them in complex ways as well as 
modify relations within the South. This has raised worries about the economic, 
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Mercantilism, Primitive Accumulation and the World Market 
The rise of the world market was a major theme in early and classical 
political economy from the 15th to 19th centuries. It rose in the context of the 
breakup of feudalism, the spread of a monetary economy, and the expansion of 
commerce regionally, nationally, and internationally. The world market 
thematic was elaborated in various doctrines of mercantilism, promoted above 
all by the representatives of merchant capital, members of the political and 
administrative elites in trading city-states, and the advisers and bureaucrats of 
emerging (and often warring) modern dynastic states. It was also linked to a 
strong commitment to state intervention to secure economic growth, laying the 
foundations for ‘the other canon’ of economic policy, with its Renaissance 
economic imaginary, that has long been marginalised in the heartlands of neo-
classical economics (Reinert ,2007; cf. Wood, 2003). 
Marx and Engels shared the late 18th and early 19th century concern with 
world society as a horizon of action and reflection, including such themes as 
world commerce, world constitution, world citizenship, world philanthropy, 
world peace, world literature, world philosophy, world civilization, and world 
history. They also criticized successive doctrines in classical political economy 
related to the mercantile phase of commercial expansion, the transfer of 
economic leadership to industrial capital, and the development of the world 
market. While these developments provide the global context in which all the 
laws of capital accumulation are actualized, Marx and Engels emphasized that 
this process was subject to leads, lags, and reversals. Thus, in The German 
Ideology (drafted in 1845-1846), they noted that: 
 
“[t]he movement of capital, although considerably accelerated, 
still remained, however, relatively slow. The splitting up of the 
world market into separate parts, each of which was exploited 
by a particular nation, the prevention of competition between 
the different nations, the clumsiness of production and the fact 
that finance was only evolving from its early stages, greatly 
impeded circulation” (Marx and Engels, 1976, 72). 
 
While foreign trade drove the world market in its infancy, its further 
development is radically reinforced by the growth of large-scale industry based 
on machinofacture. This 'universalised competition…established means of 
communication and the modern world market, subordinated trade to itself, 
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transformed all capital into industrial capital, and thus produced the rapid 
circulation (development of the financial system) and the centralization of 
capital’ (Marx and Engels, 1976, 73; see also 1998, 331). Large-scale industry is 
constantly driven to conquer new markets that have not yet been formally or 
really subsumed under the logic of capital accumulation. Thus, having initially 
driven accumulation on a world scale, foreign trade later became its product 
(1998, 235-6; cf. 1989, 58). Thus: 
 
“it is not commerce…which revolutionises industry, but 
industry that constantly revolutionises commerce. 
Commercial supremacy itself is now linked with the 
prevalence to a greater or lesser degree of conditions for a 
large industry. Compare, for instance, England and Holland. 
The history of the decline of Holland as the ruling trading 
nation is the history of the subordination of merchant's capital 
to industrial capital” (1998, 331-2). 
 
The expanded reproduction of capital demands ‘that countries in which the 
capitalist mode of production is not developed, should consume and produce at 
a rate which suits the countries with the capitalist mode of production’ (1998, 
256). The capital relation thereby comes to dominate the world market, which 
includes pre-capitalist, capitalist, and non-capitalist modes of production and/or 
forms of labour. This is reflected in two tendencies that transform centre-
periphery relations at different scales up to and including the world market: 
 
“The surplus value produced at one point requires the 
production of surplus value at another point, for which it may 
be exchanged. … A condition of production based on capital is 
therefore the production of a constantly expanding periphery of 
circulation, whether the sphere is directly expanded, or 
whether more points within it become points of production” 
(1986, 334–5). 
 
Indeed, “the more capitalistic production develops, the more it is forced to 
produce on a scale which has nothing to do with the immediate demand but 
depends on the constant expansion of the world market” (Marx, 1989, 101; 
emphasis added). 
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Furthermore, the effective operation of the world market “requires the 
full development of the credit system and competition on the world market, the 
latter being the basis and vital element of capitalist production” (Ibid, 1998, 110; 
cf. 1989, 151). As the limits of the domestic market are, for whatever reason, 
reached, it is only through the expansion of credit that capital can be employed 
profitably – by lending capital to other countries, domestic capital can create a 
market for its commodities. This is illustrated in a passage that anticipates the 
pathological co-dependence of the US and PRC economies, Marx writes: 
 
“The whole credit system, and the over-trading, 
overspeculation, etc., connected with it, rest upon the necessity 
to extend the range of, and to overcome the barrier to, 
circulation and exchange. This appears more colossal, more 
classical, in the relationship between peoples than in the 
relationship between individuals. Thus e.g. Englishmen 
compelled to lend to foreign nations to have them as their 
CUSTOMERS” (1986, 343, italics and capitalization in 
original). 
 
While the world market is the ultimate horizon of capital accumulation, 
integration proceeds in an uneven, combined manner that, using a 
contemporary scientific term, can be described as fractal. For patterns of uneven 
and combined development occur in self-similar ways on many scales. Thus, 
while North-South relations can be identified on a global scale (at the level of the 
world economy), there are similar trends at various geoeconomic scales, whether 
these involve territories, places, or networked spaces of flows. In this context, 
Marx explored, for example, differences in the national intensity and 
productivity of labour, the relative international values and prices of 
commodities produced in different national contexts, the relative international 
value of wages and money in social formations with different degrees of labour 
intensity and productivity, the incidence of surplus profits and unequal 
exchange, and so on (e.g., Marx, 1996, 317-26). 
 
Colonialism and Imperialism 
The preceding analysis may give the impression that the world market 
emerged mainly through commerce, the development of world money, the 
extension of the credit system, and the drive of industrial capital to expand its 
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export markets. This is misleading because, as noted above, for Marx, primitive 
accumulation was a crucial presupposition of the development and 
consolidation of the CMP. This connection was already noted in his early work. 
As Lucia Pradella notes, “Marx’s notebooks show that he paid attention to the 
relationship between capitalism, colonialism and world history from the very 
beginning of his economic studies” (2017, 157). For example, he wrote: 
 
“Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry 
as machinery, credit, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; 
without cotton you have no industry. It is slavery that gave the 
colonies their value; it is the colonies that created world trade, 
and it is world trade that is the precondition of large-scale 
industry” (Marx, 1976a, 167). 
 
More generally, primitive accumulation involved the creation of a formally free 
labour force by transforming slaves, serfs and independent producers into wage 
labourers, enclosing the commons and dispossessing peasants, accumulating 
treasure for investment through expropriation, looting, enslavement, conquest, 
and murder at home and abroad (1996, 741). This process unfolded bloodily in 
overlapping waves and involved an increasingly refined machinery of 
expropriation and exploitation. Marx considered that formal and informal 
colonies were “powerful levers for concentration of capital” (1996, 741) and 
further observed that: 
 
“The different moments of primitive accumulation distribute 
themselves now, more or less in chronological order, 
particularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and 
England. In England at the end of the 17th century, they arrive 
at a systematical combination, embracing the colonies, the 
national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the 
protectionist system. These methods depend in part on brute 
force, e.g., the colonial system. But they all employ the power 
of the State, the concentrated and organised force of society, to 
hasten, hothouse fashion, the process of transformation of the 
feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to 
shorten the transition” (1996, 739). 
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This process had a fractal character, occurring on many scales, and in diverse 
ways. This is illustrated in Marx’s analyses of England’s exploitation of Ireland 
(linked to the flow of the Irish rural poor into English factories and cities), the 
colonization of India (leading to the First Indian War of Independence), the 
plunder of Mexico, the failure of the European nations to fully subordinate 
China because of the close ties between agriculture and manufacturing (leading 
to the Taiping Rebellion by colonised peoples and the Opium wars), the ruthless 
exploitation in plantation colonies producing crops exclusively for the export 
trade (such as the West Indies), the development of colonies on virgin soil in 
public ownership and settled by free immigrants (such as the United States and 
Australia) (1996, 741, 751n, 755). These different aspects of what would 
nowadays be called ‘North-South’ relations are an essential and revelatory 
dimension of his analysis of the formation and integration of the world market. 
Indeed, Marx remarked that “[t]he profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism 
of bourgeois civilisation lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, 
where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked” (1979, 
222).2 
 
The Unicity of the World Market and Plurality of States 
The discussion of colonialism and imperialism, its various forms and 
modalities, and the rivalry of different European nations indicates another 
important feature of the dynamics of the world market. The shape of the 
emerging world market is related to “the particular pre-existing territorial 
features of the pre-capitalist system of reproduction and the structure of its 
administrative apparatus of rule” (von Braunmühl, 1978, 167; cf. Gerstenberger, 
2007). Initially the nature of pre-capitalist states was critical for the primitive 
accumulation of capital (through external conquest, plunder, and colonies as 
well as dispossession of pre-capitalist classes at home), the creation of a home 
market, the development of foreign trade, the relation between national monies, 
international currencies, and an emergent world money, and, finally, the global 
division of labour. Different modes of insertion into the world market at 
different stages in its development are associated with quite different forms of 
capitalism and political regime. For the world market “is not only the domestic 
2 Cited by Pradella (2017: 153). This section draws more generally on the work of Lucia 
Pradella, whose MA and PhD theses first drew my attention to the importance of Marx’s 
notebooks for the analysis of the world market. 
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market in relation to all the FOREIGN MARKETS existing outside it, but at the 
same time the domestic market of all FOREIGN MARKETS, as, in turn, 
components of the HOME MARKET” (Marx, 1986, 210, capitalization in 
original). 
As Bonefeld notes, “[t]he establishment of the national state and world 
market were both products of the same social struggles that revolutionized 
feudal social relations” (1992, 41). There is nonetheless a crucial difference 
between these processes. The world market is tendentially unified and integrated 
through the logic of profit-oriented, market-mediated competition based on 
trade, financial flows, and (capitalist) commodity production. In contrast, the 
world political system is marked by a “motley diversity” of states (Marx 1989, 
95) that tend to co-exist as hostile rivals, if not as deadly enemies. The world of 
states also involves centre-periphery and other hierarchical relations. It 
comprises a plurality of quite varied states of different size, capacities, and ability 
to defend the interests of their respective capitals and/or the capitals operating 
within the economic space(s) that they seek to govern. But these states no more 
exist in isolation from each other than do local, regional, or national markets. 
The world market and the world of states are therefore subject to different logics 
that nonetheless interact to shape the emerging dynamic of capital accumulation 
on a world scale. These aspects are closely interrelated, but one is not reducible 
to the other, with real scope for disjunctions. In their historical analyses, Marx 
and Engels provided rich and detailed studies of how this interaction unfolds in 
specific cases and affects the overall development of the world market. 
 
On North-South Relations, the ‘Third World’ and ‘Global South’ 
In contrast to Marx’s emphasis on the world market as the framework 
in which to explore capital accumulation, other approaches focus on the 
plurality of territorial states and their role in fragmenting the world market. A 
comment by Jung-en Woo (1991) illustrates what is at stake here. She claimed 
that different economic and political institutions characterize social formations 
in the ‘South’ compared with those in the ‘North’ and that this justifies different 
theoretical objects or lines of investigation. She noted that, in North East Asia 
and parts of South (East) Asia, the developmental state has attracted attention; in 
Latin America and, one might add, parts of North and South Africa, an 
important research focus has been the dependent capitalist state. This is reflected 
most recently in debates on extractivism and post-extractivism. To her list one 
might add the rentier state as an important theme in the Middle East and other 
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resource-rich regions; and, in South Asia, Africa, and East Asia, there is 
important work on the commonalities and specificities of post-colonial societies. 
While such analyses reflect the variegated nature of statehood, they sometimes 
assume an ideal-typical Western state form and neglect the variability of state 
formation and development that also occurs in the North. 
While Eurocentrism and a metropolitan bias must be rejected, this does 
not justify other essentialist forms of analysis such as ‘Southern Theory’, 
‘indigenous social science’, ‘epistemologies of the South’ or ‘subaltern studies’ 
(see for example, Connell, 2007, Joseph 1991, Sousa Santos, 2014, and Spivak, 
1987 respectively). These approaches critique the false universalism of the 
Western canon in the humanities and social sciences and their metrocentric 
accounts of modernity and elision of non-European worlds and their 
exploitation by metropolitan centres. In response, they privilege the standpoint 
of those located in the Global South or subaltern positions as somehow more 
authentic or valid than metrocentric analyses. While sympathetic to this critique 
and efforts to establish a distinctive ‘Global South’ theoretical or practical 
perspective, I consider it is more important to view both ‘North’ and ‘South’ in 
terms of the world market, the world polity, and world society. 
However, just as we must reject an unreflecting metrocentrism, caution is 
required regarding the ‘Global South’ as a ‘geopolitical imaginary’ with wider 
connotations. We should ask: why this term, why now, with which forces does it 
resonate, what material and ideal interests does it serve, can it empower 
subaltern groups, how is it being translated into academic research and/or 
policy? The term displaced the ‘Third World’ or ‘Developing World’ from 1969 
and really took off during the mid-2000s. Noting this, Tobias Schwarz observes: 
 
“By talking about the Global South, one did not constantly 
have to stress that we currently experience a world order that 
grew out of European colonial domination over most of the 
world from c1880-1914, resulting in today’s unequal 
distribution of economic and political power on a global scale” 
(Schwarz, 2015, 11). 
 
However, as Schwarz notes, these radical connotations can readily disappear 
when the term is integrated into mainstream academic and official discourse – 
replacing ‘developing countries’. This serves to divert attention from empire, 
(neo-)colonialism, and (neo-)imperialism as more appropriate entry-points for 
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exploring ‘North-South’, ‘North-North’, or ‘South-South’ relations. This is 
important in historical analyses, studies of the path-dependent effects of past 
imperial or colonial encounters, and research on current relations of economic 
dependency and dependent states. This is one of the lessons of the Latin 
American dependency school and its application to other post-colonial regions 
locked into a dependent economic, political, and socio-cultural relationship 
between industrialized and peripheral countries. Dependentistas examined the 
diverse national social formations by assessing the historical overlap of capitalist 
with pre-capitalist modes of production and/or different kinds of dependent 
insertion into the world market (see Cardoso and Faletto, 1969). However, their 
approach has been strongly criticized by Enrique Dussel for treating dependency 
“not as an international social relation and a transfer of surplus-value between 
total national capitals of different organic composition, in the framework of 
competition in the world order, but through its particular forms or merely by 
means of aspects that are secondary phenomena” (1990, 63, italics in original). 
Dussel then presents an account that draws on the 1861-63 draft manuscript for 
Capital to suggest how dependency can be explained starting from the 
fundamental categories of his critique of political economy. 
Based on these observations, a relevant solution would involve the 
following steps: (1) avoid core definitions that posit the normality or normative 
force of European or other ‘Northern’ cases; (2) develop a conceptual vocabulary 
that permits stepwise discovery of the overdetermined complexity of cases; and 
(3) emphasize the contingent variation of cases grounded in their place in 
progressively larger social configurations with due regard to their diverse spatio-
temporalities. I now explore this in terms of variegated capitalism as one way to 
explore the contrast between capital’s inherent tendency to develop the world 
market and the multiple contingencies that condition its tendential realization. 
 
Variegated Capitalism 
Variegation is an important concept for thinking about capital 
accumulation, political domination, and neoliberalization. It was introduced as a 
considered response to the risks involved in treating varieties of capitalism in 
mutual isolation or assuming that there is a single world system with its own 
master logic that governs the place and mobility of different economic spaces 
therein. The notion of variegation posits a world market divided into a tangled, 
unevenly developing hierarchy of local, regional, national, transnational, and 
supranational markets corresponding to the territories associated with given 
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states. It further posits that: (1) there is often wide variation across sectors 
and/or regions within any individual national economy, casting doubt on the 
national economy as a valid analytical unit; (2) other socio-spatial configurations 
are important too, such as emerging supranational blocs, global city networks, 
core-periphery relations, or global commodity chains; (3) the internal coherence 
of economic spaces and their governance must be combined with research on 
rivalry, competition, antagonism, complementarity, or co-evolution across 
models of capitalism in a wider division of labour; (4) in addition to horizontal 
relations between regions or nations, ‘vertical’ relations between core and 
periphery also matter; and (5) different economic spaces and their associated 
political regimes have unequal capacities to shape the world market and to 
exploit, displace and/or defer their respective problems, conflicts, and crisis-
tendencies. All of this implies that local, regional, or national varieties of 
capitalism must be linked to the dynamics of the world market and the inter-
state system taking account of the insertion of economic spaces and states into 
the hierarchically structured world system. 
In short, the approach adopted here assumes an emerging single, but 
fractally organized, variegated capitalism. This is the product of structural 
coupling, co-evolution, complementarities, rivalries, tensions, and antagonisms 
among varieties of capitalism. They are coupled not only through their territorial 
instantiation (i.e., their articulation within a world of states) but also through 
entanglements at different scales and through networks (i.e., their respective 
relations to spatial and scalar divisions of labour and spaces of flows). These 
processes set limits to compossible varieties of capitalism within a given space-
time envelope – whether this be local, regional, national, supranational, 
international, or global. 
Some varieties of capitalism in the world market (or lesser scales) cause 
more problems (or create more ‘disharmonies’) for other varieties than they can 
cause for it in the constantly changing, still emerging ‘ecological system’ that is 
formed through the interaction of all these varieties. The most influential states 
are those that shape the parameters of competition – this was the USA in the 
post-war international order and, presently, we can observe rivalries between the 
USA, the European Union, and an ascending China. This rivalry is also played 
out in interesting ways in Latin America. How varieties of capitalism are 
embedded in variegated capitalism affects how states shape and are shaped by 
the variegated global order as they seek to govern, guide or adapt to its 
development.  
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Overall this forces states at different scales to seek to manage the 
tension between (1) potentially mobile capital’s interests in reducing its place-
dependency and/or liberating itself from temporal constraints and (2) the state's 
interests in fixing (allegedly beneficial) capital in its own territory and rendering 
capital's temporal horizons and rhythms compatible with statal and/or political 
routines, temporalities, and crisis-tendencies. One response to such pressures is 
the rise at different scales of ‘competition states’. These not only promote 
economic competitiveness narrowly conceived but also seek to subordinate 
many areas previously seen as ‘extra-economic’ to the currently alleged 
imperatives of capital accumulation (Jessop, 2002, 95-139). There are different 
forms of competition state that reflect the different modalities of 
competitiveness, how they are integrated, if at all, into accumulation strategies 
and state projects, and states’ abilities to promote these strategies and projects. 
For example, the Listian Workfare National State is oriented to catch-up 
competitiveness and the horizon for catching-up changes over time. In turn, the 
Prebischian Populist National State was oriented to counteracting adverse terms 
of trade between primary exports and industrial imports and sought, frequently 
with limited success, to enhance national competitiveness through import-
substitution industrialization behind tariff walls. 
World market integration is a contradictory process. On the one hand, 
it enhances capital’s capacity to defer and/or displace its internal contradictions 
by increasing the scope of its operations on a global scale, reinforcing its 
capacities to disembed certain of its operations from local material, social, and 
spatio-temporal constraints, enabling it to deepen the spatial and scalar divisions 
of labour, creating more opportunities for moving up, down, and across scales, 
commodifying and securitizing the future, and re-articulating different time 
horizons. It also weakens the capacity of organized labour to resist economic 
exploitation through concerted subaltern action across different fields. On the 
other hand, these enhanced capacities greatly reinforce tendencies to uneven 
development as the search continues for new spatio-temporal fixes to move the 
costs of capitalist contradictions elsewhere and/or into the future to create local 
zones of stability. It also undermines the power of national states to regulate 
economic activities within mainly national frameworks. And, insofar as it 
decreases the power of the working class, it increases inequalities of income and 
wealth, strengthens the potential for overproduction and weak demand, and, as 
is now widely recognized in critical political economy, creates the potential for 
financialization and finance-dominated accumulation as a driving force of even 
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further – but destabilizing – world market integration. It is important to reject 
the idea that relatively smooth and harmonious economic growth in some places 
could ever be generalized throughout the world market. For capital 
accumulation proceeds through a process of uneven and combined development 
that creates zones of instability and crisis as both a condition and effect of 
relatively crisis-free expansion elsewhere. Increasing integration of the world 
market also undermines the power of national states to regulate economic 
activities within mainly national frameworks. As the ultimate limit to capital is 
capital itself, the expansion and integration of a relatively unfettered (or 
disembedded) world market enhances the scope for its contradictions to be 
realized as well as for resistance to become global. 
Variegated Neoliberalism: Neoliberalism is also variegated and for 
similar reasons. Its four main forms arose as reactions to the crisis of post-World 
War II models of capitalist development: Atlantic Fordism in advanced capitalist 
economies, import-substitution industrialization in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa, export-oriented growth in East Asia, and, in a different but 
related context, state socialism in the Soviet Bloc, China, and Indo-China. The 
most radical form was neoliberal system transformation in the successor states 
that emerged from the former Soviet Bloc: Russia and Poland are two cases with 
contrasting outcomes. Next in the continuum of cases come neoliberal regime 
shifts. Breaking with the post-war Atlantic Fordist compromise between capital 
and labour, these shifts introduced liberalization, deregulation, privatization, 
market proxies in the public sector, internationalization, and cuts in direct 
taxation. These policies were intended to modify the balance of forces in favour 
of capital and have largely succeeded in this regard. Well-known cases are 
Thatcherism and Reaganism. While identified with right-wing parties, neoliberal 
regime shifts have also been supported by centre-left parties, often under a 
‘Third Way’ label. Moreover, with help from northern friends and/or military 
dictatorships, many Latin American economies undertook such shifts (albeit in 
response to crises in the import-substitution industrialization model, notably 
indebtedness and inflation) from the 1970s to the-1990s. 
Whereas the second form is largely rooted in domestic politics, the 
third comprises economic restructuring processes and regime shifts that were 
primarily imposed from outside by transnational economic institutions and 
organizations backed by leading capitalist powers and their local partners. This 
form typically involves neoliberal policies in line with the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ as part of a quid pro quo for financial and other assistance to crisis-
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ridden economies in parts of Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America, Asia 
and Africa (e.g., Gowan, 1996; Gwynne and Kay, 2000; Robinson, 2008; Sader, 
2008; Veltmeyer, Petras and Vieux, 1997). Whether neoliberalism originates 
mainly in domestic or external political processes and whether its associated 
policies are pursued through democratic or authoritarian political devices and 
measures, the policies adopted in the second and third forms of neoliberalism 
often overlap when they occur outside advanced capitalist economies. 
Fourth, there are more pragmatic and potentially reversible neoliberal 
policy adjustments. These comprise modest changes deemed necessary to 
maintain alternative economic and social models in the face of 
internationalization and a global shift in the balance of forces. The Nordic social 
democracies and Rhenish capitalism provide examples. Despite the fluctuating 
political fortunes of the parties more favourably included towards them, these 
adjustments can nonetheless lead to the development of a neoliberal regime 
through the gradual accumulation of changes that are never (fully) reversed. 
Neoliberal system transformation largely failed as a ‘grand project’. 
Neoliberal regime shifts required flanking and supplementing by ‘third way’ 
policies, networks, and public-private partnerships. Neoliberal policy 
adjustments were sometimes reversed, sometimes gradually cumulated. The 
quack cure of neoliberal structural adjustment often aggravated the underlying 
disease, leading, in Latin America, to the revival of populist politics and 
demands that governments distance themselves from the neoliberal excesses. 
With the waning of the pink wave in Latin America, however, neoliberalism is 
being rolled out yet again, reinforcing its residual, path-dependent legacies in 
that region as elsewhere. 
 
Capital’s Contradictions and Neoliberalism 
The world market is “in which production is posited as a totality and all 
its moments also, but in which simultaneously all contradictions are set in 
motion” (Marx, 1986, 160, italics added). But what are these contradictions? 
Marx offers several accounts that are not fully consistent. But we can distinguish 
two main approaches. The first rests on the general principles of the materialist 
approach to history and posits a contradiction that takes different forms in 
different epochs: the emergent contradiction between the development of the 
forces of production and the social relations of production, such that the latter 
become a fetter on the further development of the former. In the CMP, this is 
expressed in the contradiction between the growing socialization of productive 
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forces through the deepening of the social division of labour on a global scale 
and the continuing private ownership and control of the forces of production 
and the appropriation of profit. More important for present purposes, however, 
are Marx’s remarks on the contradictions specific to the capitalist mode of 
production (CMP) – starting with the contradiction in its economic cell form, 
namely, the commodity, and related forms in the capital relation. 
Central to the commodity form is the contradiction between the use-
value and exchange-value aspects. Among analogous contradictions are that: 
productive capital is both abstract value in motion (notably in the form of 
realized profits available for reinvestment) and a concrete stock of already 
invested time- and place-specific assets in the course of being valorized; the 
worker is both an abstract unit of labour-power substitutable by other such units 
(or, indeed, other factors of production) and a concrete individual (or member 
of a concrete collective workforce) with specific skills, knowledge and creativity; 
wages are both a cost of production and a source of demand; money functions 
both as an international currency exchangeable against other currencies (ideally 
in stateless space) and as national money circulating within national societies (or 
pluri-national monetary blocs) and subject to a measure of state control; land 
functions both as a form of property (based on the private appropriation of 
nature) deployed in terms of expected revenues in the form of rent and as a 
natural resource (modified by past actions) that is more or less renewable and 
recyclable; knowledge is both the basis of intellectual property rights and a 
collective resource (the intellectual commons) (for more details, see Jessop, 
2002). 
Neo-liberalism is significant in the development of the world market 
and, a fortiori, in generalizing the contradictions of the capital relation. Recalling 
the argument in The German Ideology about the incomplete development of the 
world market, we might conclude that the world-historical ‘achievement’ of neo-
liberalism is to reduce (without ever eliminating) two of the four obstacles to the 
development of the world market. These are the frictions and constraints on 
capital accumulation deriving from states as ‘national power containers’ and the 
persistence of ‘inefficient’ financial markets. Neo-liberalism thereby frees money 
capital (and its associated forms of credit) as the most abstract expression of the 
capital relation to move around the world market to maximize its chances for 
profit. It increases the emphasis on speed, acceleration, and turnover time and 
thereby strengthens the dominance of exchange-value over use-value in the 
global economy, reinforces capital’s short-term ‘indifference’ to its natural and 
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social environment, and changes the extra-economic relations that facilitate the 
global expansion of capitalism and weaken resistance to these effects. 
This helps in turn to emancipate the monetary profit-oriented, market-
mediated moment of capital accumulation from extra-economic and spatio-
temporal constraints, increases the emphasis on speed, acceleration, and 
turnover time, and enhances capital's capacity to escape the control of other 
systems insofar as these are still territorially differentiated and fragmented. 
This generalization and intensification of contradictions can be seen in 
the ways that the extension, deepening, and tendential completion of the world 
market has been promoted in the shadow of neo-liberalism. The latter has 
reinforced the exchange-value moments (or, stated subjectively, the profit 
motive) over the use-value moments (or substantive aspects) of the capital 
relation. The typical policies of neo-liberalism comprise: liberalization, de-
regulation, privatization, the use of market proxies in the residual state sector, 
internationalization, and the lowering of direct taxes. Separately and together 
these measures privilege value in motion (i.e., liquid capital), the treatment of 
workers as disposable and substitutable factors of production, the wage – 
including the social wage – as a cost of (international) production, money as 
international currency (especially due to the increased importance of 
derivatives), nature as a commodity, and knowledge as intellectual property.  
Moreover, as capital becomes increasingly freed from the constraints of 
national power containers and increasingly disembedded from other systems, 
unrestrained competition to lower socially necessary labour-time, socially 
necessary turnover time, and naturally necessary production time (i.e., the 
reproduction time of ‘nature’ as a source of wealth) becomes an ever more 
powerful driving force in the dynamic of capital accumulation. Supported by an 
emphasis on shareholder value, this particularly benefits hypermobile financial 
capital, reinforcing its competitiveness and enhancing its abilities to displace and 
defer problems onto other economic actors and interests, other systems, and the 
natural environment. Yet this will also enhance the scope for the contradictions 
and dilemmas of a relatively unfettered (or disembedded) capitalism to shape the 
operation of other systems and may thereby undermine crucial extra-economic 
conditions for accumulation (Jessop, 2007). 
 
The World Market and Crisis 
The dominance of neo-liberalism has introduced some interesting new 
features into the dynamic of the world market that set it apart from earlier 
The World Market, ‘North-South’ Relations, and Neoliberalism | 221
periods of free trade imperialism as well as from more overtly statist periods of 
capitalist development. In particular, neo-liberal globalization strengthens 
capital's chances of avoiding the structural constraints of other institutional 
orders and their control efforts, thereby increasing its ‘indifference’ to its social 
environment. The continuing internationalization and globalization, especially 
of financial capital, are crucial processes in enabling the logic of capital to 
operate more completely than ever before on a global scale. Whether there is a 
solution to these problems is discussed in the closing sections of my 
contribution, which address the nature of world society, global civil society, and 
questions of institutional design for a better future. 
Credit creation has a major role in promoting the profitable expansion of 
capital. In turn, however, profit fluctuations in the real economy (which is 
always-already monetary in Marx’s analysis) are critical to monetary crises that 
are directly rooted in industrial and commercial crisis. These crises occur when 
declining profits lead to a liquidity-driven ‘dash for cash’ or, alternatively, 
encourage speculative investments in the financial sector in the search for higher 
profits. Regarding the rush for hard money, Marx noted that: 
 
“In times of a squeeze, when credit contracts or ceases entirely, 
money suddenly stands as the only means of payment as the 
only means of payment and true existence of value in absolute 
opposition to all other commodities. Hence the universal 
devaluation of commodities. the difficulty or even 
impossibility of transforming them into money ... For a few 
millions in money, many millions in commodities must 
therefore be sacrificed. This is inevitable under capitalist 
production ... As long as the social character of labour appears 
as the money existence of commodities, and thus as a thing 
external to actual production, money crises – independent of 
or as an intensification of actual [in the real economy] crises – 
are inevitable” (Marx, 1998, 514). 
 
Crises can also arise directly from the circuits of financial capital, especially 
when capitalist credit relations become uncoupled from the circuits of 
productive capital due to the expansion of fictitious capital. Marx related this to 
finance and speculation. An excess of fictitious capital (its oversupply) can lead 
to the dissociation between changes in fictitious capital and underlying 
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movements in the real economy. Accordingly, “[a]ll connection with the actual 
expansion process of capital is thus completely lost, and the conception of 
capital as something with automatic self-expansion properties is thereby 
strengthened” (Marx, 1998, 464; cf. 828). Such monetary or financial crises can 
affect the wider economy through contagion and feedback effects. Once again, 
then, the contradictions at the heart of the capital relation are expressed in the 
circuits of capital – this time in the contradictions of the money form and its role 
in the expanded reproduction of capital. While not fully developed, key elements 
for a Marxist analysis of these issues are provided in the second and third 
volumes of Capital and Theories of Surplus Value (1989: 103-53). 
Money Forms, Functions, and Derivatives: One aspect of the rise of 
neoliberalism is financialization, including the development of securitization 
and, especially, the rise of derivatives and their massive expansion. For, as Marx 
anticipated (not only in his remarks on the world market but also in his remarks 
on fictitious capital and the contradiction between capital as value and capital as 
property), this generalizes and intensifies competition in relation to means of 
production, money capital, specific capitals as units of competition, and social 
capital. Derivatives are the most generalized form of this capacity. They have a 
growing role in the commensuration of all investment opportunities in the 
world market (Bryan and Rafferty, 2006). This activates “all the contradictions” 
of the capital relation (Marx, 1989, 140, 163). 
Referring again to The German Ideology on the early limits to the 
development of the world market, we could say that derivatives greatly facilitate 
its completion. For they tend to: 
 
• overcome the frictions of national boundaries, 
• open national economies to foreign competition, 
• help to overcome the clumsiness of production, 
• enhance the role of finance in promoting competition 
 
Derivatives as forms of financial innovation integrate production on a world 
scale and, via their role in all the functions of money that Marx identified, they 
also contribute to market completion in real time. Yet derivatives represent a 
fetishized form of money as money and money as capital. As more-or-less 
rarefied forms of fictitious capital, they bear little relation to the movement of 
real values. Indeed, they reinforce the separation between (1) the general 
movement of capital based on valorization and the generation of surplus-value 
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anchored in production and (2) the more superficial real-world appearances of 
money prices and profit, which nonetheless have consequences for all circuits of 
capital. 
While confidence in the money-form is retained, the credit system can 
create asset bubbles and fuel self-feeding speculation. This in turn can divert 
capital from productive investment into short-term speculation oriented 
towards fluctuations in prices of fictitious capital rather than movements in the 
real (but still monetary) economy – with increasing volatility and, for those able 
to exploit volatility, opportunities for superprofits based on hedging, shorting, 
front-running, and so forth: “Credit…crowds out money and usurps its place. It 
is faith in the social character of production which allows the money-form of 
products to assume the aspect of something that is only evanescent and ideal, 
something merely imaginative” (Marx, 1998, 568). 
The destructive impact of financialization is reinforced by the neo-liberal 
approach to accumulation through dispossession (especially the politically-
licensed plundering of public assets and the intellectual commons) and the 
dynamic of uneven development (enabling financial capital to move on when 
the disastrous effects of financialization weaken those productive capitals that 
must be valorised in particular times and places). Yet this also enhances the 
scope for the contradictions and dilemmas of a relatively unfettered (or 
disembedded) capitalism to shape the operation of other systems and may 
thereby undermine crucial extra-economic conditions for accumulation. Indeed, 
in contrast with Fordism and the post-Fordist knowledge-based economy, the 
post-Fordist neo-liberal financial regime militates against the long-term 
structured coherence of accumulation regimes and their modes of regulation. In 
particular, it weakens the spatio-temporal fixes with which regimes based on the 
primacy of productive capital manage the contradictions between fixity and 
motion to produce zones of relative stability by deferring and displacing their 
effects. This is shown in the impact of financialization not only in Atlantic 
Fordism but also in the export-oriented economies of East Asian and the 




This article has not directly addressed North-South relations, the Third 
World, or the Global South. Each of these notions represents specific political 
and ideological imaginaries in the post-war era with specific geoeconomic and 
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geopolitical functions. They also serve to disguise the continuities in the world 
market from the early days of mercantilism, protectionism, colonization, and 
primitive accumulation. This does not mean that nothing has changed through 
the uneven development of the world market, changes in the forms of unequal 
exchange as long waves of technological and economic development succeed 
and overlap each other, shifts in economic and political hegemony among 
advanced capitalist powers, and the reordering of relations within the imperialist 
heartlands as well as between the heartlands, contending powers in the semi-
periphery, and the most marginal economic and social spaces.  
Hegemony has shifted from the Venetian republic via the Dutch 
commercial empire, the British empire (with its informal and formal, internal 
and external colonies and its capacity to dominate the world market), the 
ascendant American empire (consolidated after the Second World War but 
prefigured in Latin America, the Philippines, and elsewhere), the challenge from 
an integrating European Union and militarily dependent Japan, and, most 
recently, the rise of China (with its ambitions to re-integrate and promote the 
Eurasian heartland as well as huge investments in Latin America and Africa and 
growing influence in Europe and North America). The hierarchies in the semi-
periphery have also been reshuffled. This was recently manifested in the 
displacement of the centres of economic gravity linked to the rise of the BRICS 
(Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) economies and their efforts to 
coordinate their position as middle powers. However, the distinctive crisis-
tendencies of their respective varieties of capitalism and the constraints 
associated with their differential insertion into the variegated world market has 
meant that only China has fulfilled the expectations hyped in the BRIC(S) story 
first narrated after the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade 
Centre in 2001. But these movements occur on many scales and not simply at 
the level of inter-state economic and political relations. 
These complexities are important. Nonetheless, when exploring the world 
market, as Marx argued, the more integrated the world market becomes, the less 
scope there is to resolve crises by extending capitalist relations into previously 
marginal economic zones. Thus, crises will, 
 
“…become more frequent and more violent, if only because, as the 
mass of production, and consequently the need for extended markets, 
grows, the world market becomes more and more contracted, fewer 
and fewer [new] markets remain available for exploitation, since every 
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preceding crisis has subjected to world trade a market hitherto 
unconquered or only superficially exploited” (Marx 1977: 228). 
 
One aspect of these increasingly global and severe contradictions and crisis-
tendencies is, as Marx anticipated, the environmental problems inherent in the 
treadmill of capital accumulation as a mode of appropriating and transforming 
nature that has no formal limits – but, as we are experiencing, hugely 
constraining material limits (cf. Burkett, 1999; Foster, 2000; Saito, 2017). 
Eventually, Marx argued, the repeated displacement of crisis through the 
intensive and extensive development of capital would finally reach its limit and 
increasingly severe general world crises would erupt. This would point to the 





Bonefeld, W. (1992). Social constitution and the form of the capitalist state. In: 
Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, and Kosmas Psychopedis, eds, Open 
Marxism: Dialectics and History, London: Pluto, 93-132. 
Bryan, R. & Rafferty, M. (2006). Capitalism with Derivatives: A Political 
Economy of Financial Derivatives, Capital and Class. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Burkett, P. (1999). Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective. New York: St. 
Martins. 
Cardoso, Fernando H. and Faletto, Enzo (1969). Dependencia y desarrollo en 
América Latina. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI. 
Connell, R. (2007). Southern Theory. The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in 
Social Science. Cambridge: Polity. 
Dussel, E. (1990). Marx’s economic manuscripts of 1861–63 and the ‘concept’ of 
dependency. Latin American Perspectives 17(2): 62–101. 
Foster, J. B. (2000). Marx’s Ecology. Materialism and Nature. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
Gerstenberger, H. (2007). Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois 
State. Leiden: Brill. 
Gowan, P. (1996). Eastern Europe, Western Power and Neo-Liberalism. New 
Left Review Series I, 216: 129-40 
226 | Social Inequality and the Spectre of Social Justice
Gwynne, R. N. & Kay, C. (2000). Views from the Periphery: Futures of 
Neoliberalism in Latin America. Third World Quarterly 21: 141-156. 
Hollander, S. (2008). The Economics of Karl Marx: Analysis and Application. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jessop, B. (2002). The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity. 
Jessop, B. (2012). Neo-Liberalism. In: George Ritzer, ed., The Wiley-Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Globalization, vol. 3, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1513-21. 
Joseph, S. (1991). Indigenous Social Science: Some Political Implications. 
Economic and Political Weekly 13 April: 959-63. 
Marx, K. (1976a). The Poverty of Philosophy. In: MECW 6. London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 105-212. 
Marx, K. (1976b). Speech of Dr Marx on protection, free trade, and the working 
classes. In: MECW 6, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 287-290. 
Marx, K. (1977). Wage Labour and Capital In: MECW 9. London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, (197-28. 
Marx, K. (1979). The future results of British rule in India (22 July 1853). In 
MECW 12. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 217-22. 
Marx, K. (1986). Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58 (First Version of Capital). 
MECW 28, London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Marx, K. (1989). Economic Manuscript of 1861-63 (Continuation). MECW 32, 
London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Marx, K. (1996). Capital, vol. 1. MECW 35 London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Marx, K. (1998). Capital, vol. 3. MECW 37, London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Marx, K. (1989). Marginal Notes on the Programme of the German Workers 
Party. In: MECW 24, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 81-100. 
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1976). The German Ideology. In: MECW 5. London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 19-539. 
Pradella, L. (2014). Globalization and the Critique of Political Economy: New 
Insights from Marx’s Writings. London and New York: Routledge. 
Pradella, L. (2017). Marx and the Global South: Connecting History and Value 
Theory. Sociology 51(1), 141-61. 
Reinert, E. S. (2007). How Rich Countries Got Rich ... and Why Poor Countries 
Stay Poor. London: Constable. 
Robinson, W. I. (2008). Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical 
Globalization Perspective. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
The World Market, ‘North-South’ Relations, and Neoliberalism | 227
Sader, E. (2008). The Weakest Link: Neoliberalism in Latin America. New Left 
Review, Series II, no. 52: 5-32. 
Saito, K. (2017). Karl Marx’s Ecosocialism: Capital, Nature, and the Unfinished 
Critique of Political Economy. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Schwarz, T. (2015). What I thought of the term Global South … before I learned 
how the mainstream uses it. In: Concepts of the Global South, Köln: 
GSSC.  
de Sousa Santos, B. (2014). Epistemologies of the South. Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers. 
Spivak, G. (1987). Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography. In: Selected 
Subaltern Studies, edited by Gayatri C. Spivak and Ranajit Guha, 3-22. 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Veltmeyer, H., Petras, J., & Vieux, S., eds. (1997). Neoliberalism and Class Conflict 
in Latin America. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
von Braunmühl, C. (1978). On the analysis of the bourgeois nation state within 
the world market context. In: John Holloway and Sol Picciotto (eds) 
State and Capital, London: Arnold, 160-77. 
Woo, J. (1991). Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Wood, E. (2003). The Empire of Capital, London: Verso. 
228 | Social Inequality and the Spectre of Social Justice
